What’s the big idea? The basic idea is that while the general consensus is that the post World War II period has been a period of “globalization” my argument is that it has been a period of increased nationalism. The end of colonialism meant there was a “proliferation of sovereigns” as there were many, many, more countries with borders, flags, currencies, armies, etc. each of which were (nominally at least) independent actors within a global order. This global order was intended to be “liberal” about movements of goods and capital (less so) across borders with some global institutions set up to promote that. These did not extend to developing countries in the 1960s and 1970s (in which they were essentially exempt from GATT discipline) and they (often) had restrictions on foreign exchange transactions (for any purpose) and maintained fixed exchange rates . The “structural adjustment” era was largely about bringing developing countries into the existing global order on more equal terms (that is, with binding reciprocal obligations as GATT moved to WTO, IMF pushed for market determined exchange rates, etc. ). (Yes, this not the way this agenda is usually perceived). But movement of labor has always been, more or less, off the global agenda. I call this the POSEBLL global order: Proliferation of Sovereigns with Everything but Labor Liberalization. This is still, fundamentally, a country (misleading referred to as “nation-state”) based system in which empires dissolved (first the first world’s and then the second world’s), national sovereignty is central, and true “deep integration” efforts–like the EU–are rare (and, as we are seeing, fragile).
“The Cliff at the Border.” 2009. Globalization and Equity. Ravi Kanbur and Michael Spence eds. Growth Commission. In this discussion of “globalization and equity” I triple deny the premise. This paper has one of my favorite phrases, that I believe no one ever read: “All in all, I find myself confused and out of touch in discussions about “globalization” and “equity” as I do believe in God but don’t believe in Sudan, whereas everyone around me seems to have the opposite view.” Turns out, I was (not surprisingly given events to date by 2009) I was right to not believe that Sudan was a “nation-state” as the split with South Sudan revealed.